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Supplemental Material for Gilbert, Davis, Gaskell & Rodd 
Analysis of unaware participant subsets 
 The main analyses were repeated on the subset of participants who did not report any 
awareness of either the priming manipulation or the use of ambiguous words. In all of these 
subset analyses, the models used the same random effects structure as that in the main 
analysis. 
Experiment 1  
 The results were consistent with those reported in the main analysis, with the exception 
that effect of Test Modality was significant in the main analysis and non-significant in the 
subset of ‘unaware’ participants, β = 0.13, SE = 0.08, z = 1.59, p = .111; χ2(1) = 2.50, p = 
.114. The main effect of Prime Type was significant, χ2(2) = 32.83, p < .001. There was a 
significant effect of priming, β = 0.48, SE = 0.09, z = 5.64, p < .001, and no significant 
difference between Auditory and Visual Prime conditions, β = 0.07, SE = 0.09, z = 0.77, p = 
.443. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons showed that there were significantly more 
subordinate meaning responses in both the Auditory Prime (z = 4.59, p < .001) and Visual 
Prime (z = 5.32, p < .001) conditions compared to the Unprimed conditions, and that the 
Auditory Prime and Visual Prime conditions were not significantly different (z = 0.77, p = 
.441).   
 There was no significant interaction between Prime Type and Test Modality, χ2(2) = 0.77, 
p = .680. The interaction between Test Modality and the first Prime Type contrast, primed vs 
unprimed, was non-significant, β = -0.13, SE = 0.17, z = -0.73, p = .465. More importantly, 
the model coefficient for the interaction between Test Modality and the second Prime Type 
contrast, Auditory Prime vs Visual Prime, was also non-significant, β = 0.09, SE = 0.19, z = 
0.50, p = .619. 
Experiment 2 
 Response times. The pattern of results was generally consistent with the main analysis. 
The only difference was that in the main analysis there was no main effect of Test Modality, 
whereas this effect was significant in the ‘unaware’ group of participants, β = -0.02, SE = 
0.01, t(112) = -2.26, p = .026; χ2(1) = 5.06, p = .025. The effect was due to faster responses 
for Visual Test vs Auditory Test conditions in this group. 
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 The main effect of Prime Type was significant, χ2(2) = 20.47, p < .001. Correct responses 
were faster for items in the primed vs unprimed conditions, β = -0.03, SE = 0.01, t(6133) = -
4.31, p < .001. There was no significant difference between the Auditory Prime and Visual 
Prime conditions, β = 0.01, SE = 0.01, t(6153) = 1.46, p = .146. Pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni correction showed that responses to Unprimed items were slower than to items in 
both the Auditory Prime (z = -4.45, p < .001) and Visual Prime (z = -3.05, p = .007) 
conditions, and that the Auditory and Visual Prime conditions did not significantly differ (z = 
1.46, p = .436). 
 There was no significant interaction between Prime Type and Test Modality, χ2(2) = 1.37, 
p = .505. The model coefficients was not significant for the interaction between Test 
Modality and the first Prime Type contrast (unprimed vs primed), β = 0.02, SE = 0.02, t(113) 
= 0.98, p = .321. Importantly, the interaction between Test Modality and the second Prime 
Type contrast (Auditory Prime vs Visual Prime) was remained non-significant in this subset, 
β = -0.01, SE = 0.02, t(75) = -0.57, p = .570.  
 Accuracy. The results in the ‘unaware’ group followed the same pattern as in the main 
analysis. There was a significant effect of Test Modality, with more correct responses to the 
Visual Test than Auditory Test conditions, β = 0.16, SE = 0.07, z = 2.34, p = .019; χ2(1) = 
5.23, p = .022. There was also a significant effect of Prime Type on response accuracy, χ2(2) 
= 22.02, p < .001. There were more correct responses to primed vs unprimed items, β = 0.33, 
SE = 0.08, z = 4.47, p < .001, and to items in the Visual Prime vs Auditory Prime conditions, 
β = 0.26, SE = 0.09, z = 3.06, p = .002. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons showed 
that both the Auditory Prime and Visual Prime conditions produced significantly more 
correct responses than the Unprimed condition (z = 2.53, p = .035, and z = 3.06, p = .007, 
respectively). 
 There was no significant interaction between Prime Type and Test Modality, χ2(2) = 2.73, 
p = .256. The model coefficient for the interaction between Test Modality and the first Prime 
Type contrast (unprimed vs primed) was not significant, β = 0.21, SE = 0.14, z = 1.50, p = 
.135. The coefficient for the critical interaction between Test Modality and the second Prime 





Experiment 2 range analysis 
 In addition to the Experiment 2 main analyses, the use of the speeded test provided the 
opportunity to conduct exploratory analyses to investigate the time-course of priming effects 
using a range analysis (Lindsay, Sedin, & Gaskell, 2012; McQueen, 1991; Pitt & Samuel, 
1993). Specifically we were interested in whether the effect of priming can be observed 
across the whole distribution of RTs, or whether it is driven primarily by differences in the 
slower responses (i.e. the right-hand tails of the distributions). The latter would suggest that 
priming effects emerged relatively late in the semantic decision process, with individuals 
being more likely to make very slow responses to unprimed targets, and more incorrect 
responses on these slow trials. By contrast, effects of priming in both the fast and slow ranges 
would indicate that priming effects can also emerge earlier in the decision process. Here we 
only compared primed and unprimed conditions because the main analyses revealed no 
reliable effects of modality on priming. 
 Using a strategy similar to that used by Lindsay et al. (2012), we categorised responses as 
being either fast or slow, while taking into account variability due to the participant, item, and 
condition associated with each individual data point. An intercepts-only LME model was run 
on the log-transformed RTs, and for each trial, the relevant item intercept that was estimated 
by the model was subtracted from the log-transformed RT. These adjusted response times 
were then categorised as fast or slow, where trials with adjusted log RT values less than the 
participant/condition median were considered ‘fast’ and those above this median were ‘slow’. 
When there was an odd number of data points, the middle value was treated as ‘slow’1. This 
resulted in similar numbers of (relatively) fast and slow responses across conditions2. This 
categorisation procedure was done separately for the RT analysis (only correct responses) and 
the accuracy analysis (both correct and incorrect responses). Because of the difference in 
these data sets, the categorisation of the correct responses as either fast or slow differed 
slightly between the two analyses3.  
 Figure 1 shows the subject grand means for RTs and proportions of errors by priming 
condition and speed category. Overall, there were more errors in the fast than slow category, 
                                                 
1 The analyses were also run with the middle data points categorised as ‘fast’, and the pattern of results did not 
change for either the RT or accuracy analyses. 
2 In the RT analysis, there were 5278 fast and 5454 slow responses, and an average of 29.7 trials per participant 
in each speed category. In the accuracy analysis, there were 7010 fast responses and 7052 slow responses, and 
an average of 38.8 trials per participant in each speed category.  
3 From the RT to accuracy categorisation, 4.8% of correct responses changed from ‘fast’ to ‘slow’ and 2.1% 
changed from ‘slow’ to ‘fast’. 
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reflecting the speed-accuracy trade-off that is characteristic of speeded decision making tasks. 
For the RT analyses, LME models were run on the log-transformed RTs with priming 
condition (primed or unprimed) as a fixed factor, and with by-item and by-subject random 
intercepts and slopes for priming condition. Significance tests for model coefficients (with 
Satterthwaite’s approximation for degrees of freedom) and likelihood ratio tests comparing 
the full model to a model without a fixed effect for priming condition revealed a significant 
effect of priming in both the relatively fast responses, β = -0.03, SE = 0.01, t(176.1) = -5.42, 
p < .001, χ2(1) = 25.89, p < .001, and slow responses, β = -0.03, SE = 0.01, t(87.7) = -4.62, p 
< .001, χ2(1) = 18.91, p < .001. In both subsets, the correct responses were faster when the 
target word was primed than unprimed. We ran the same set of analyses on the accuracy data 
and found a significant effect of priming in both the fast responses, β = 0.42, SE = 0.09, z = 
4.57, p < .001, χ2(1) = 15.67, p < .001, and in the slow responses, β = 0.24, SE = 0.08, z = 
2.94, p = .003, χ2(1) = 7.20, p = .007. In both subsets, there were more correct responses for 
primed items compared to unprimed items. Together these RT and accuracy results show 
that, rather than being limited to the relatively slow semantic relatedness decisions, priming 




Figure 1. Experiment 2 response times (A; in ms) and proportions of errors (B) in the 
semantic relatedness test task. Bars are grouped by response speed category on the x-axis 
(Fast, left bars; Slow, right bars; see text for categorisation details) and colour-coded by 
priming condition (Primed, light gray; Unprimed, dark gray). Bars show the subject grand 
averages, and error bars show 95% CIs, adjusted to remove between-subject variance 
(Morey, 2008). 
 
 Because we used a speeded task to examine access to word meanings, we were able to 
examine the time-course of priming effects. Separate analyses of the fast and slow responses 
(categorised relative to the item and participant distributions, and within priming conditions) 
revealed significant priming effects in both speed categories. This result shows for the first 
time that word-meaning priming is not entirely due to differences emerging at later stages of 
the decision making process, but instead appears to affect word interpretation and meaning 
access even in earlier stages. 
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